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Assuring Separation of Safety and Non-safety Related Systems
Hunter, B.
Safety standards call for the separation of safety and nonsafety
related systems. Although good guidance is
provided in these standards on how to achieve the
required hazard analysis, safety integrity assignment and
validation to prove a safe system, there is little available
on establishing safety boundaries around the critical
components and the proof of isolation from non-safety
functions. Delineation between safety and non-safety
systems is particularly important where it is impractical to
substantiate a Safety Integrity Level of the overall system
due to the complexity of some components. In this case it
is better to assume high failure probability of the nonsafety
system and prove isolation from the safety-related
system.
This paper explores a conceptual methodology (including
the use of Fault Tree Analysis and Common Cause
Failure Analysis) for establishing and assuring separation
of systems and some examples from training simulators
that are an example of this situation drawn from real-life.
Cite as: Hunter, B. (2006). Assuring Separation of Safety and Non-safety Related Systems. In Proc. Eleventh Australian Workshop on Safety-Related Programmable Systems (SCS 2006), Melbourne, Australia. CRPIT, 69. Cant, T., Ed. ACS. 45-51.
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