The Language of System Safety Engineering: Loose Language Surrounding ALARP

White, T.A.

Whilst there may be some debate as to what exactly qualifies a person as a System Safety Engineer (or how each professional institution/domain may perceived such a creature), one factor which acts as a significant discriminator in identifying said Engineer, is the precision of the language they use to describe the various safety attributes of a design or engineering process. Due to the potential ambiguities of natural language (or more particularly Engineering-English), and the ever-present emotional bias, which pervades discussions of safety, it is vitally important to consider meaning, perception and interpretation in the choice of language in everything we say and do. Regardless of the specific engineering domain there will always be a fundamental requirement to make some statement that the equipment under consideration is acceptably safe and that the associated risk is ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practical). Experience has shown that the precise meaning of acceptability and the underlying concept of ALARP is poorly understood and articulated. In this paper we will consider why language is so important to the discipline of System Safety, particularly when talking about risk acceptability, and why we should always be vigilant, to the use of loose or sloppy safety language amongst our fellow engineers, recognising that clarity, as with any other aspect of the engineering design process, is vital to the success of the endeavour. The potential for misunderstanding is ever present and ignoring this danger ultimately has the potential to undermine any claims that safety has been assured.

Cite as: White, T.A. (2011). The Language of System Safety Engineering: Loose Language Surrounding ALARP. In Proc. Australian System Safety Conference 2011 (ASSC 2011) Melbourne, Australia. CRPIT, 133. Cant, T. Eds., ACS. 85-94

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