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The Agnostic Hazard
McCormick, G.F.
This essay examines the nature and consequences of a
regulatory double standard in safety-critical digital systems
for civil aviation. An argument is made that everyone
involved in civil aviation - system developers, regulators,
and the flying public - would be served better by
a single standard of safety in the design assurance of
complex aviation systems. An existing standard,
RTCA/DO-264, Guidelines for Approval of the Provision
and Use of Air Traffic Services Supported by Data Communications
[DO-264], is proposed as a suitable basis for
unified design assurance.
Cite as: McCormick, G.F. (2008). The Agnostic Hazard. In Proc. Thirteenth Australian Conference on Safety-Related Programmable Systems (SCS 2008), Canberra, Australia. CRPIT, 100. Cant, T., Ed. ACS. 11-15.
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