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A Lightweight Approach to Formal Safety Architecture Assurance: The PARTI Case Study
Mahony, B.P. and Cant, T.
Safety Critical Systems are those with the potential to
cause death or injury as a result of accidents arising from
unintended system behaviour. The arguments for safety,
along with the body of supporting evidence, make up what
is called the Safety Case. Requirements and guidance for
Safety Cases are given in Def (Aust) 5679 Issue 2 [2]; in
this standard the key stages of the Safety Case are: Hazard
Analysis, Safety Architecture and Design Assurance. The
process is driven by the identification of System Safety Requirements.
The standard requires an argument be made
that the Safety Architecture meets the System Safety Requirements.
In the most serious cases, this argument is required
to be made in a formal language and supported by
formal reasoning tools. In this paper, we demonstrate the
feasibility of such formal argument through the presentation
of a formal verification argument for a simplified case
study in Defence safety engineering.
Cite as: Mahony, B.P. and Cant, T. (2008). A Lightweight Approach to Formal Safety Architecture Assurance: The PARTI Case Study. In Proc. Thirteenth Australian Conference on Safety-Related Programmable Systems (SCS 2008), Canberra, Australia. CRPIT, 100. Cant, T., Ed. ACS. 37-48.
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