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An Approach to Vickrey-based Resource Allocation in the Presence of Monopolistic Sellers
Pham, H.N., Teo, Y.M., Thoai, N. and Nguyen, T.A.
Market-based approaches proposed recently proved
to be promising for competitive resource sharing in
peer-to-peer and grid computing. Many approaches
leverage on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to achieve incentive compatibility which embraces truthful bidding of participating agents. This
paper addresses a deficiency of VCG that to the best
of our knowledge has not been studied. When one
or more agents possess a large portion of the market
share of resource, a monopoly situation arises. Applying VCG mechanism does not lead to an allocation
because the second price cannot be mathematically
determined. Using both theoretical and simulation
analysis, we show the importance of addressing this
problem. Our results show that monopoly situation
arises in many types of market settings, from auction to exchange, and with a relatively high occurrence rate. To address this, we propose a new pricing method suitable for many market settings that
achieve budget balanced and economic efficiency but
relax the strategy proof property. |
Cite as: Pham, H.N., Teo, Y.M., Thoai, N. and Nguyen, T.A. (2009). An Approach to Vickrey-based Resource Allocation in the Presence of Monopolistic Sellers. In Proc. Seventh Australasian Symposium on Grid Computing and e-Research (AusGrid 2009), Wellington, New Zealand. CRPIT, 99. Roe, P. and Kelly, W., Eds. ACS. 77-83. |
(from crpit.com)
(local if available)
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